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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between acyclicity and singleton cores of many-to-one
matching markets. A cycle in the preferences of firms arises when there is an alternating
list of firms and workers “in a circle” such that every firm in the cycle prefers the worker on
its clockwise side to the worker on its counterclockwise side but finds both acceptable. The
preferences of one side of the market are acyclical if they have no cycles of any length. We
prove that the absence of simultaneous cycles implies that the core is a singleton. Further-
more, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that
guarantees that the stable set is a singleton.
We show that the notion of acyclical preferences is a generalization of the notion of
common preferences. Indeed, if the preferences of one side of the market are acyclical,
unique stable matching can be obtained through a “corrected” serial dictatorship. It follows
that if firm preferences (workers) are acyclical and publicly known, it is a dominant strategy
for workers (firms) to reveal their true preferences. Finally, we prove that the absence of
simultaneous cycles implies that unique stable matching is strongly efficient for both sides of
the market.
The existence of singleton cores is relevant to the matching market literature. Sönmez
1996) studies strategy-proofness in the context of college admissions problems and shows
that there exits an allocation rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational and strategy-
proof if and only if each college has an unlimited number of slots or, in other words, if
the core is single valued. Sönmez (1999) generalizes this result to more general matching
problems. Alternative conditions for singleton core have been presented in the literature.
Eeckhout (2000) identifies a sufficient condition for singleton cores in the context of marriage
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problem. This condition requires that no male or female prefers a mate of the opposite six
with the same rank order below his or her own order. Clark (2006) too introduces a sufficient
condition for singleton cores called no crossing condition. Our condition is independent from
the conditions in Eeckhout (2000) and Clark (2006).1 Ehler and Massó (2007) explore the
relationship between singleton cores and the existence of equilibrium in centralized matching
markets with incomplete information. They show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the revelation game, which is induced by a common belief and stable
mechanism if and only if all profiles that are in support of the common belief have singleton
cores.
Ergin (2002) introduces an alternative notion of acyclicity and shows that worker-optimal
stable matching is efficient if and only if the preferences of the firms are acyclical .2 Haeringer
and Klijn (2009) show that Ergin acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash
implementation of the stable correspondence. In the context of housing markets, Kesten
(2006) showed that for some fixed priority profiles the deferred acceptance rule and the top
trading cycle rule are equivalent if and only if the preference profile is acyclic (see also Kesten
2010).
Finally, Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011) prove that when the hospital-optimal stable
rule is employed, acyclicity is the minimal condition that guarantees the stability of NE of
the capacity manipulation games.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and in Section 3
and its relation to serial dictatorship and efficiency. Section 4 concludes.
1Examples are available upon request.
2Ergin’s acyclicity is weaker than the concept of acyclicity used in this paper but it is independent of the
notion of “absence of simultaneous cycles”. Furthermore, Ergin’s acyclicity does not guarantee that the stable
set is a singleton.
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2 The Model
In the hiring problem examined in this paper, there are a number of workers, each of whom
is seeking a position at one of many firms. Let F = {f1, ..., fk} be the set of firms, let
W = {w1, ..., wt} be the set of workers, let PF = (Pf1 , ..., Pfk) be a list of the firms’ preferences
on workers and let PW = (Pw1 , ..., Pwt) be a list of workers’ preferences on firms. The triple
(F,W,P ), where P = (PF , PW ) is called a Matching Market. For every f ∈ F , Pf , there
is a strict order defined on 2W , the set of all subsets of W .3 Let W ′ ⊂ W be a set of workers.
The preferred group of workers for firm f among the ones belonging toW ′ is called the choice
set from W ′. It is denoted by Chf (W ′, Pf ) or by Chf (W ′), when there is no potential for
ambiguity. Formally, Chf (W ′, Pf ) = argmaxPf {W ′′ : W ′′ ⊂ W ′}. If ∅PfW ′, firm f prefers
not to employ any worker rather than jointly employ the workers in W ′ and W ′ is called
unacceptable to f . Otherwise, W ′ is acceptable to f . A (f) denotes the set of workers
who are individually acceptable to f . The maximum numbers of workers firm f is willing to
hire is f ’s capacity and is denoted by qf , or formally qf = max {|W ′| : Chf (W ′, Pf ) $= ∅}.4
For every w ∈W , Pw there is a strict order defined on F ∪ {w}. Any firm f such that wPwf
is called unacceptable to w. Otherwise, f is acceptable to w. A (w) denotes the set of
firms that are acceptable to w. For every agent x ∈ F ∪W , Rx denotes x’s weak preference
relation.
A matching allocates workers to firms. Amatching on (F,W ) is a function µ : F ∪W →
2W ∪ F such that for every (f, w) ∈ F ×W : (i) µ(f) ∈ 2W , (ii) µ(w) ∈ F ∪ {w} and (iii)
µ(w) = f ⇔ w ∈ µ(f). We denote by M the set of matchings on (F,W ). A matching µ
3For all w,w′ ∈ S wPfw′, wPf∅ and ∅Pfw denote {w}Pf {w′}, {w}Pf∅ and ∅Pf {w}, respectively.
4|W ′| stands for the cardinality of the set W ′
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is individually rational if (i) Chf (µ(f)) = µ(f) for all f ∈ F and (ii) µ(w)Rww for all
w ∈ W . A matching µ is blocked by the pair (f, w) ∈ F ×W if (i) fPwµ(w) and (ii)
w ∈ Chf (µ(f) ∪ {w}). A matching µ is stable in (F,W,P ) if it is individually rational and
no pair blocks it. Otherwise, µ is unstable. Γ(F,W,P ) denotes the stable set, which is the
set of matchings that are stable in market (F,W,P ).
The stable set may be empty. This is why the literature has focused on preference restrictions
according to which workers are not seen as complements. A firm f has responsive preferences
if, for any two assignments that differ by one worker only, the firm prefers the assignment
associated with the preferred worker. Formally, Pf are responsive if for all W ′ ⊂ W such
that !W ′ ≤ qf − 1 and for all w, w′ ∈ W : (i) W ′ ∪ {w}PfW ′ ∪ {w′} ⇔ wPfw′ and (ii)
W ′∪{w}PfW ′ ⇔ w ∈ A (f). Under this restriction, the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale
and Shapley 1962) produces either the firm-optimal or the worker-optimal stable matching,
which is denoted by µF and µW , respectively, depending on whether the firms or the workers
make the offers (see Roth and Sotomayor 1990). Throughout the paper we assume that the
preferences of every firm are responsive.
When there is no risk of ambiguity, we use PF and PW to denote the following binary relations
within the set of matchings. For every µ,ν matchings, let µPFν if and only if µ (f)Rfν (f)
for all f ∈ F and µ (f)Pfν (f) for at least one f . Let µPWν if and only if µ (w)Rwν (w) for
all w ∈W and µ (w)Pwν (w) for at least one w.
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3 Acyclicity and singleton cores
A cycle in the preferences of the firms is a list of firms and workers “in a circle” in which every
listed firm prefers the worker on its clockwise side to the worker on its counterclockwise side
and finds both acceptable. Formally:
Definition 1 A cycle (of length T + 1) in the preferences of the firms is given by
f 0, f1, ..., fT such that ft $= ft+1 for t = 0, ..., T and distinct w0, w1, ..., wT such that
1. wTPfTwT−1....w1Pf1w0Pf0wT ,
2. for every t, wt ∈ A (ft) ∩ A (ft−1).5
Assume that a cycle exists. If every wt is initially assigned to ft+1, every firm is willing
to exchange its assigned worker with its successor. The notion of a cycle in the preference of
the workers is specular.
A simultaneous cycle arises when there is a list of firms and workers that are simultane-
ously a cycle for the preferences of the firm and the preferences of the worker. Formally:
Definition 2 A simultaneous cycle of length T + 1 is a set of firms f0, f1, ..., fT and
workers w0, w1, ..., wT forming a cycle both in the preferences of the firms and of the workers.
If there are not simultaneous cycles, the stable set is a singleton.
Proposition 1 Assume that no simultaneous cycle exists. If this is the case, the stable set
of (F,W,P ) is a singleton.
5From now on indices are considered modulo T + 1.
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Proof. To prove that the stable set of (F,W,P ) is a singleton when no simultaneous cycle
exists, we show that if the stable set is not a singleton then there exists a simultaneous
cycle. Assume that the stable set is not a singleton. Then there are two stable matching
µ, ν such that µPFν and νPWµ. Set W ′ = {w : ν (w)Pwµ (w)} $= ∅. Let f0 ∈ µ (W ′), then
µ (f0)Pmν (f0). Let w0 ∈ µ (f0)\ν (f0), w0 ∈M ′ = µ (W ′). For all n ≥ 1 set fn+1 = ν (wn+1)
if wn $= wt for every t < n and set fn+1 = fn otherwise. Observe that f0 $= f1. Let
wn = maxPfn−1µ (fn−1) \ (ν (fn−1) ∪ {w1, ..., wn−1}) if µ (fn−1) " ν (fn−1)∪ {w, ..., wn−1} and
set wn+1 = wn otherwise. The sequence is stationary becauseW is finite and it stops at some
n¯ > 1 such that fn = fn+1. Let l be such that fl = fn. Set jn = wn+l and rn = fn+l for every
n ≤ n− l. The sequence comprises different workers and two consecutive distinct firms. This
sequence satisfies µ (jn) = rn = ν (jn+1) for n ≤ n − l, and ν (jl) = r0. It follows that (i)
j0Pr0jkPrk−1jk−1......j2Pr2j1Pr1j0 and (ii) r0PjkrkPjkrk−1...Pj0r0 . Thus, j0, ..., jl, r0, ..., rl is a
simultaneous cycle.
From Proposition 1, it follows that the acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the
market guarantees that the stable set is a singleton. From this perspective, the acyclicity
condition is a minimal condition that guarantees that the stable set is a singleton.
Proposition 2 Assume that there is a cycle in PF (in PW ). If this is the case, there exists
a profile of preferences for the workers, PW (for the firms, PF ), such that the stable set of
(F,W,PF , PW ) contains at least two matchings.
Proof. Assume that there a is cycle in PF . Let f0, ..., fT and w0, ..., wT be as they are in
Definition 2. Let F ′ = F \ {f0, ..., fT} and let W ′ = W \ {w0, ..., wT}. Let PW ′ be any
vector of the preferences for the workers in W ′ such that A (w) ⊂ F ′ for all w′ ∈ W ′. Let
µ¯ be any stable matching of (F ′,W ′, PF ′ , PW ′). Let Pwi : fi, fi+1 for w = 0, ..., T − 1 and
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PwT : fT , f0. Let Pw : w if w /∈ {w0, ..., wT}. Let PW = (PF ′ , Pw0 , ..., PwT ). Define the
matchings µ and ν as follows: µ (wi) = fi and ν (wi) = fi+1 for i = 0, ..., T − 1, v (wT ) = f0.
Let µ (w) = ν (w) = µ¯ (w) if w ∈ W ′. Both µ and ν are stable in (F,W,PF , PW ), so the
stable set of (F,W,PF , PW ) contains at least two stable matchings, µ and ν.
The proof of the claim when there is a cycle in PW is identical and thus omitted.
3.1 Acyclicity and serial dictatorship.
Next, we attempt to determine the restrictiveness of the acyclicity assumption. To this end,
we first consider the case in which every worker (firm) is acceptable to all firms (workers). In
this case, the preferences are acyclical if and only if they are the same for every firm (worker).
Proposition 3 Assume that wPf∅ (fPww) for every w ∈ W and for every f ∈ F . The
preferences of the firms (workers) are acyclical if and only if the firms (respectively workers)
have the same preferences on individual workers (respectively firms).
Proof. Assume that the preferences of the firms are acyclical and that wPf∅ for every
w ∈ W and for every f ∈ F . Then there is no cycle of length two. This implies that all
firms have the same preferences because all workers are acceptable to every firm Next, we
prove that if the firms have the same preferences on individual workers, then there is no
cycle in the preference of the firms. The proof is obtained by contradiction. Assume that
w0Pf0wTPfTwT−1....w1Pf1w0 for some T and some w0, ..., wT , f0, ..., fT . Because Pf0 = PfT ,
we have w0Pf0w1 and w1Pf0w0, which yields a contradiction.
The proof of the claim when the preferences of the workers are acyclical and fPww is
identical and is thus omitted.
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As we can see in the following example, the result does not hold when some workers are
not acceptable to every firm.
Example 1 Let F = {f1, f2, f3} ,W = {w1, w2, w3}. Let Pf1 : w1w2, Pf2 : w2w3, Pf3 : w3w1.
Let Pw1 : f3f1, Pw2 : f1f2, Pw3 : f2f3
There is a simultaneous cycle of length three w1Pf1w2Pf2w3Pf3w1, f3Pw1f1Pw2f2Pw3f3,
but there is no cycle of length two. Let qf1 = qf2 = qf3 = 1. The market (F,W,P ) has two
stable matchings µ and ν defined by µ (w1) = f1, µ (w2) = f2, µ (w3) = f3 and ν (w1) = f3,
ν (w2) = f1, ν (w3) = f2.
It is well known that under common preferences, the stable set can be generated by a
serial dictatorship. This result still holds true when the preferences are acyclical. If the
preferences of the firms are acyclical, there is an underlying order on the set of the workers
such that the unique stable matching is generated by a “corrected” serial dictatorship: the
first worker chooses from among the firms at which she is acceptable, worker t chooses from
among the firms at which she is acceptable and which have at least one position available,
and so forth.
Proposition 4 If the preferences of the firms are acyclical, there is an ordering of the work-
ers wi1 , ..., win such that the stable matching µ is given by:
µ (wi1) = max
Pwi1
{f ∈ F : witPf∅}
µ
(
wit+1
)
= max
Pwit+1
{
f ∈ F : wit+1Pf∅
} \ {f ∈ F : |{wis : s ≤ t, µ (wis) = f}| = qf}
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for all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n− 1.
Proof. Assume that the preferences of the firms are acyclical. Let wi1 ∈W such that there
are no w ∈ W and f ∈ F such that wPfwi1Pfˆ∅. Such a wi1 exists because PF is acyclical.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, let wit+1 ∈ W such that there are no w ∈ W \ {wi1 , ..., wit} and f ∈ F
such that wPfwit+1Pf∅. Such a wit+1 exists because PF is acyclical. To complete the proof
it suffices to show that the matching µ defined in the claim is stable. The proof is obtained
by contradiction. Let it be such that (wit , f) blocks the µ. Set Ft = {f ∈ F : witPf∅} \
{f ∈ F : |{wis : s ≤ t, µ (wis) = f}| = qf}. We have µ (wit) = maxPwit Ft. First, assume that
|µ (f)| < qf . Then, f ∈ Ft, yields a contradiction. Second, consider the case in which
|µ (f)| = qf . Because (wit , f) blocks µ, witPfw for some w ∈ µ (f). From the definition of
the sequence i1, ..., in, it follows that w = wis for some s > t. Thus, f ∈ Ft, which yields a
contradiction. .
An analogous result holds when the preferences of the workers are acyclical.
Proposition 5 If the preferences of the workers are acyclical, there is an ordering of the
firms fi1 , ..., fim such that the stable matching µ is given by:
µ (fi1) = Ch
(
Pfi1 , {w ∈W : fitPww}
)
µ
(
fit+1
)
= Ch
(
Pfit+1 ,
{
w ∈W : fit+1Pww
} \ {w ∈W : w ∈ µ (fis) for some s ≤ t}) ,
for all t, 1 ≤ t ≤ m− 1.
The proof of Lemma 5 is similar to the proof of Lemma 4 and is thus omitted.
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Specifically, if the preferences of the workers are acyclical and publicly known, it is a
dominant strategy for the firms to reveal their true preferences and capacities if using any
selection from the stable set is used (see Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2011).
Corollary 1 Let µ (PF , PW ) ∈ Γ (F,W,PF , PW ) for all PF , PW .
1. Assume that PF is acyclical. Then, for every w ∈ W µ (PF , PW )Rwµ (PF , P ′w, P−w) or
all P ′w.
2. Assume that PW is acyclical. Then, for every f ∈ F µ (PF , PW )Rfµ
(
P ′f , P−f , PW
)
for
all P ′f .
Additionally, the existence of singleton cores in the many to one matching problems avoids
simple manipulation strategies on the colleges’ side as the use of truncation strategies.
3.2 Simultaneous Cycles and Efficiency.
For the marriage model, Roth (1982) shows that there is no individually rational matching
that all agents of one side on the market strictly prefer to their corresponding optimal stable
matching. Roth (1985) extends this result to the college admissions problem, which shows
that this weak Pareto optimality property holds for the “one side” of the market if the
preferences of the firms are responsive.6 Roth (1985) also shows that the property is, in
general, false for the “many side” of the market.
From Proposition 4 (5), it follows that if the preferences of the firms (workers) are acycli-
cal, then unique stable matching is strongly efficient for the workers (firms). The same result
holds when the preferences do not have simultaneous cycles.
6Martínez et al. (2004) shows that this property does not holds if the preferences are substitutable but
not responsive.
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Proposition 6 Assume that there are not simultaneous cycles and let µ be the unique stable
matching. There are no individually rational matchings ν,ρ such that νPWµ or ρPFµ.
Proof. We prove that if there exists a matching ν such that νPWµ, then there exists a
simultaneous cycle. Define two sequences of workers and firms {wt}0≤t≤T−1 and {ft}1≤t≤T
as follows. Let w1 ∈ W such that ν (w1) $= µ (w1). For all t ≥ 1 set ft = ν (wt). For all
t ≥ 1, let wt ∈ µ (ft) \ (µ (ft) ∪ {w1, ..., wt−1}). The sequence stops when it reaches some T
such that µ (fT ) ⊂ (ν (fT ) ∪ {w1, ..., wT−1}). Such a T exists because W and F are finite.
Set K = max {t < T | ft = fT}. There is no loss of generality in assuming K = 1. The firms
f1, ..., fT−1 are distinct and T ≥ 3 because ft $= ft+1 for every t = 1, ..., T − 2. The workers
w1, ..., wT−1 are distinct by construction. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2, ν (wt) = ft = µ (wt+1) and
fT = µ (w1). We have f1Pw1f2Pw2f3...fT−1PwT−1fT = f1. Let t ≥ 1. We have wt $/∈ µ (ft),
wt+1 ∈ µ (ft) and ν (wt)Pftµ (wt). Thus wt+1Pftwt, otherwise (ft, wt) would block µ. It
follows that w1, ..., wT , f1, ..., fT constitute a simultaneous cycle.
The proof of the other part of the claim is identical and is thus omitted.
4 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper has been to show the roles that the acyclicity of the preferences
and, in particular, the absence of simultaneous cycles have in the design of well behaved and
efficient mechanisms. We have shown that by imposing acyclical priorities or by verifying that
acyclicity is satisfied by the agents’ preferences, we can guarantee the existence of singleton
cores.
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Singleton cores play an important role in the practical design of markets. As an example,
in the NMRP, Roth and Peranson (1999) found that the core in the NMRP for a set of
reported preferences was small but not a singleton. This result was both surprising and
extremely relevant for deciding the proper version of the deferred acceptance algorithm to
be implemented in the redesign of the NMRP. In addition, the existence of singleton cores in
the many-to-one matching problems avoids simple manipulation strategies on the colleges’
side by using truncation strategies (Ma, 2002, 2010, see also Sotomayor, 2011). In this paper,
we have shown that the absence of simultaneous cycles implies that the core is a singleton.
Additionally, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market guarantees that the
core is a singleton. This finding is particularly relevant because in problems in which the
agents are endowed with priorities acyclicity can be implemented in the design.
Acyclicity can also contribute to avoiding strategic behavior and facilitating the provision
of efficient allocations. In this sense, we find that if the preferences of the firms are acyclical
and publicly known, it is a dominant strategy for workers to reveal their true preferences.
Therefore, the strategic interaction among the both sides of the market is simplified.
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